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Abstract
A central question in the empirical scal policy literature is the magnitude, in fact even
the sign, of the scal multiplier. Standard identication schemes for scal VAR models
typically imply positive output as well as labor productivity responses to expansionary
government spending shocks. The standard macro assumption of decreasing returns to
labor, however, implies that expansionary government spending shocks should lead to
increasing output and hours, but to decreasing labor productivity. To potentially reconcile
theory and empirical analysis we impose, amongst other sign restrictions, opposite signs
of the impulse responses of output and labor productivity to government spending shocks
in eight- to ten-variable VAR models, estimated on quarterly US data. Doing so leads to
contractionary eects of positive government spending shocks. This potentially surprising
nding is robust to the inclusion of variable capital utilization rates and total factor
productivity.
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1 Introduction
There is a large empirical literature (starting with Blanchard and Perotti, 2002) that uses
structural VAR models to estimate the eects of shocks to government spending on the busi-
ness cycle. A particular focus of this literature is on the identication of the scal multiplier,
i.e., the eect of changes in government spending on aggregate output. Empirically, most
studies nd that an unexpected increase in government spending raises real output for at least
a number of quarters, though the exact size of the multiplier is controversial. The central
problem for the empirical scal policy literature is, of course, the problem of identication of
exogenous changes in government spending. There is no consensus in the literature concern-
ing which set of identifying restrictions should be used to disentangle government spending
shocks from other shocks that aect cyclical variations in macroeconomic data.
In this paper, we propose to use the response of (hourly) labor productivity to help
identify government spending shocks. The basic idea is straightforward: Consider the scal
transmission mechanism that is embedded in most current DSGE models. If the government
unexpectedly increases its spending, the resulting intertemporal tax burden imparts a neg-
ative wealth eect on households, which consequently expand their labor supply. Since the
capital stock is predetermined in the short run, under a standard constant returns to scale
aggregate production function there are decreasing returns to labor. As a consequence, the
scal expansion should be associated with rising hours and output, but with decreasing hourly
productivity.1 Based on this stylized observation, we propose to use the restriction that out-
put and labor productivity should respond with opposite signs as one of the identication
conditions in a sign restricted VAR model.
We rst review some popular alternative ways of identifying government shocks, namely
that of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) who rely on a recursive ordering where government
spending is assumed to be exogenous within the quarter; and the one proposed by Ramey
(2011) who additionally controls for anticipation eects by estimating responses to the in-
novations to her narrative measure of the present discounted value of expected military ex-
penditures. We demonstrate that either of these approaches implies an increase in labor
productivity after a positive government spending shock in quarterly US macroeconomic
data, opposite to the theoretical expectation based on the standard view of the scal trans-
mission mechanism. Utilizing the above considerations on the relation between output and
productivity responses to government spending shocks we estimate several variants of sign
1We consider the alternative possibility that government spending is productive in the sense of immediately
shifting the aggregate production function unlikely for reasons discussed in section 3.2.
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restricted VAR models for US quarterly macroeconomic time series. Sign restrictions have
been used earlier in the literature on scal policy eects, e.g., by Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
or Pappa (2009). The distinctive feature of our approach is the use of a sign restriction
invoking the response of labor productivity that forces the estimated government spending
shock responses to be compatible with the existence of an aggregate production function with
constant returns to scale. In particular, we identify a government spending shock through
the restrictions that the resultant impulse responses lead to positive comovement between
government spending and public decits, positive comovement between hours and output,
and negative comovement between output (or hours) and labor productivity.
Using these restrictions, we nd that the median target impulse response, as dened in
detail in appendix A, of private (non-farm business) output to a positive shock to government
spending is negative. Since negative output reactions to government spending increases are
in obvious contradiction to the consensus in the previous empirical literature, we undertake
various robustness checks. In particular, we allow for cyclical capital utilization, and also
include a measure of total factor productivity. The basic result remains: as soon as we impose
that productivity and output have to comove negatively after government spending shocks,
the median target impulse response implies a negative output reaction. Bootstrap condence
bands around the median target impulse response indicate that this negative response is
statistically signicantly dierent from zero for several periods.
Note that there are two possible interpretations of our result: First, it could be the case
that government spending shocks do indeed have negative short run consequences for output
and hours. In this case, one would have to assume that other identication schemes leading
to the opposite result tend to confound the uctuations due to government spending shocks
with those due to other disturbances, e.g. technology shocks. Second, the transmission of
government spending shocks needs to be analyzed in a setting featuring increasing returns to
scale, since the data do not appear to be compatible with the combination of positive output
eects of government spending and a constant returns to scale production function.
The empirical result that government spending seems to increase labor productivity is, of
course, related to a nding emphasized earlier in the literature, viz., that positive government
spending shocks appear to have a positive eect on the real wage rate (e.g., Perotti, 2007,
Monacelli and Perotti, 2008). With decreasing returns to labor, the real wage is, from a
theory perspective, expected to fall if a government spending shock induces increasing labor
supply. However, several authors, e.g., Hall (2009), Monacelli and Perotti (2008), or Ravn et
al. (2007), have pointed out that higher wages may be compatible with higher employment if
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the price-marginal cost markup that imperfectly competitive rms charge declines in response
to higher government spending. The point emphasized in the present paper is that even if
declining markups make rising employment compatible with higher real wages, the increase in
labor productivity that is also present in the data can still not be explained. Put dierently,
whatever the behavior of the markup is, it does not contribute to solving the question how
sizably more output can be produced, following a government spending shock, with labor
input changing only weakly.
Methodologically, we essentially use sign restrictions to impose a log-linear approxima-
tion to a standard neoclassical production function on the impulse responses. We propose
to view this method as a combination of the a-theoretical nature of VAR modelling with a
structural assumption concerning an aggregate production function underlying the US econ-
omy, whilst leaving all other equations unrestricted. This approach is similar in spirit to
Arias et al. (2015), who use sign (and zero) restrictions to constrain impulse responses in a
monetary VAR model such that they are compatible with a plausible central bank reaction
function. Whereas Arias et al. (2015) require impulse responses to a monetary policy shock to
reproduce a standard monetary policy rule, we impose a standard production function on the
impulse responses to distinguish demand side disturbances, like government spending shocks,
from supply side shifts in the production function itself. In both instances, the idea is to
use only the structural information from relatively uncontroversial parts of a macroeconomic
model that is implicitly thought of as the data generating process.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the sign restrictions that are
used for identication of government spending shocks in more detail. In section 3, we rst
demonstrate the tendency for procyclical productivity responses under the Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) and Ramey (2011) identications of government spending shocks. We then
discuss possible interpretations and present our own results based on sign restrictions. Finally,
we show the central result to be robust to the inclusion of cyclical capacity utilization and total
factor productivity. When including both additional variables we combine sign restrictions
with standard short run (point) restrictions. Section 4 concludes. Two appendices follow the
main text. Appendix A presents some details of the econometric approach and appendix B
contains some further results.
2 Government spending shocks and labor productivity
Our main goal is to distinguish empirically between the eects of government spending shocks
and of productivity shocks on the private business sector. To this end, we start by assuming
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that private (i.e., non-farm business) sector output Yt is generated by a constant returns to
scale production function that is standard in macroeconomics, i.e.,
Yt = F (Zt;Ht; St); (1)
where Zt is unobservable technology, Ht is labor input (measured in hours worked in the non-
farm business sector), and St are the services derived from the installed capital stock. We
concentrate on a log-linear approximation to this production function, where log-deviations
from the balanced growth path are denoted by lower case letters. The log-linear representation
of the production function is:
yt = zt + aht + (1  a)st; (2)
with a 2 (0; 1). This representation is exact in the special case that the production function
is Cobb-Douglas, whereas for more general functional forms it is a rst order approximation.
The parameter a 2 (0; 1) is the production elasticity of labor input, which in the Cobb-
Douglas case is equal to the share of labor in total output. For other constant returns to
scale production functions, that do not imply constancy of the labor share, the parameter a
can also assume other values in the interval between zero and one. Macroeconomic models
typically calibrate values for a in the range from 0:6 to 0:7.
Now consider estimating a VAR model containing (among others) the variables from
above. Then, following any shock hitting the economy, the estimated impulse responses of
output, technology, hours worked and capital services should, to a rst order approximation
at least, be related to each other as the variables in (2). In the following we will repeatedly
compare relations between impulse response functions of VAR models and log-linearized
structural economic relations.
We use this idea to disentangle government spending shocks from other shocks, in partic-
ular from technology shocks. If in period t a shock that does not change technology occurs,
then zt = 0 holds in this period and the impulse responses hence fulll:
yt   ht = (a  1)ht + (1  a)st: (3)
However, capital services are typically not directly observable. We consider two alternative
specications to deal with this problem. The rst assumes that capital services st are equal
to the stock of installed capital (or are a xed proportion of it), and the second assumes that
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capital services are given by the product of a time variable utilization rate and the capital
stock. We present the rst specication in the current section, and defer the discussion of
the second as a robustness exercise to section 3.4.
If capital services are identical to the capital stock, then { since the capital stock is
predetermined in the short run and slowly moving in response to shocks in general { their
contribution can be neglected as long as the focus is on the economy's behavior in the imme-
diate aftermath of a few quarters after a shock hits. Thus, the impact or short run eect of
a non-technological shock on labor productivity is well approximated by:
yt   ht  (a  1)ht; (4)
since st  0 on impact. Given the standard range of estimates of a 2 [0:6; 0:7], this implies
that in the short run, if a non-technological shock increases hours worked by one percent,
labor productivity should decline by between  2:5 to  3:3 percent. In the limiting case
where a ! 1, the eect on labor productivity vanishes. Importantly, however, it cannot be
positive for any value of a that implies decreasing or constant returns to labor in production.
While the exact value of a is unknown in general, (4) is nonetheless useful as the basis for
identifying government spending shocks based on the signs of impulse responses. In particular,
suppose we have estimates of a reduced form VAR model, and consider a particular candidate
orthogonalization of the residuals in order to identify structural government spending shocks.
Denote the impulse responses for the candidate orthogonalization at horizon j  0 to a
government spending shock ft by a tilde over variables (e.g., eyj = @ log Yt+j=@ft). Our
maintained hypothesis is that government spending does not have a direct eect on technology
(see below for further discussion of this point) and that the capital stock is predetermined
in the short run. Therefore, a structural government spending shock should produce impulse
responses that are compatible with (4) with a 2 (0; 1) and that, hence, need to have the
following properties:
(i) eyj and ehj have the same sign;
(ii) eyj and eyj   ehj have opposite signs.
Since these properties of impulse responses can be expected to be present, in the short
run, after any type of non-technological (or demand side) shock that leaves total factor
productivity unchanged, we need a further restriction to ensure that the particular demand
side shock we identify is indeed a government spending shock. Therefore, letting egj and edj
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denote the impulse responses at horizon j of government spending and the decit, respectively,
we add:
(iii) egj and edj have the same sign.
Below, we make use of these properties in the form of sign restrictions on the impulse re-
sponses of VAR models to identify government spending shocks. Restriction (i) requires that
output and labor must comove positively, which is a basic requirement if a non-technological
shock is considered and capital is predetermined in the short run. In this case labor is the
only variable factor that can adjust in the short run to produce more or less output. Re-
striction (ii) is crucial for our approach. It imposes the decreasing returns to labor property
following from a constant returns to scale production function with predetermined capital.
Under non-technological shocks, output can only rise if measured labor productivity declines,
such that we observe a positive response eyj only if eyj   ehj declines at the same time, or
vice versa. This restriction is pivotal in the present context, since it imposes the condition
that a government spending shock is a pure demand side disturbance that does not shift the
aggregate production function as, e.g., a technology shock would. Finally, condition (iii)
serves to single out government spending shocks from other non-technological disturbances.
It imposes that government spending shocks are at least partly decit nanced over the short
run. This assumption is plausible in view of the political decision process, with spending
changes rarely linked to specic tax changes required to nance them.
Note, importantly, that conditions (i) to (iii) neither constrain the signs of the reactions
of output nor of hours worked to a government spending shock. It is only the relation between
these two reactions that is restricted. The idea is that the basic notion of a demand side
disturbance brought about by government spending changes imposes the required pattern
of comovement between the impulse responses, as long as the data generating process is
characterized by a constant returns to scale production function. It is left unrestricted,
and hence decided by the data, whether this implies that output and hours increase while
productivity decreases, or that output and hours decline while productivity rises.
In the next section, we proceed in three steps. First, in section 3.1 we review some
popular identication schemes that have been used in the scal VAR literature to identify
government spending shocks. We discuss whether the impulse response functions generated
by these models are compatible with the theoretical requirements that characterize responses
to government spending shocks as set out in conditions (i) to (iii) in section 3.2. Since the
answer turns out to be negative, we proceed in section 3.3 by directly imposing conditions
(i) to (iii) as the restrictions to identify government spending shocks via sign restrictions on
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VAR model impulse responses. Finally, in section 3.4 we investigate the robustness of the
results with respect to allowing for variable capital utilization.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Review of existing scal VAR model results
We start o by reviewing standard ndings of the empirical literature on the eects of govern-
ment spending shocks. Given the above discussion, negative comovement between the impulse
responses of output and labor productivity to government spending shocks should prevail.
Consequently, the rst question we ask is whether the available scal VAR model results are
compatible with this restriction. The answer is no. In section 3.3 we therefore present results
where we impose this negative comovement between the output and productivity responses
to government spending shocks via sign restrictions.
All VAR models considered in this paper are estimated with quarterly US data from
1948q1 to 2013q4, which is the longest period over which all variables are available. The
variables used in the baseline specication in this section are the logarithm of real government
consumption and investment spending, logGt; the logarithm of real output in the non-farm
business sector, log Yt; the logarithm of hourly labor productivity, log Yt   logHt, where Ht
is hours worked in the non-farm business sector; the logarithm of real net taxes, log t;
2 the
nominal three months treasury bill rate, Rt; the ination rate as measured by the annualized
log change in the deator of non-farm business output, t; the government decit, Dt, dened
as minus total government saving as a fraction of GDP; and the logarithm of real private
nonresidential investment, log It.
We have checked the robustness of our results by using, instead of t as dened above, the
Barro{Redlick (2011) measure of the average marginal tax rate, which is available only up to
2008q4 and thus requires using a shorter sample. The results do not change by much, and
therefore we use in our analysis the tax measure t and the longer sample until 2013q4. The
data on hours worked and the Barro{Redlick tax rate have been downloaded from Valerie
Ramey's website, the other variables are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
FRED database, except for private nonresidential investment, which is from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Expressing the ow variables as per capita values by dividing through
population does not change the results appreciably. To match the approach commonly used
in the literature, all models also contain a constant as well as linear and quadratic time trends
2Here t is dened as government current tax receipts plus contributions for government social insurance
less government current transfer payments, deated by the GDP implicit price deator.
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and are estimated with four lags of each endogenous variable.
Note that in all estimates below both output and hours, and thus productivity, are mea-
sured for the private (non-farm business) sector only. This seems important in the present
context, because using economy-wide measures { such as real GDP and total hours worked {
could be misleading. The reason for this is that GDP also contains the public sector output,
which is dicult to measure and for which the existence of a standard production function
is not necessarily guaranteed. Therefore, we only investigate the response of private output
and private hourly productivity to government spending shocks. That being said, the re-
sults reported below only change very little if economy-wide GDP based measures for output
and productivity are used instead of the non-farm business data, as we have ascertained by
running this specication as another robustness check.
For comparison with our own results shown in the next subsection, as a rst step we show
the implications of three commonly used VAR identication methods for the response of labor
productivity in the private non-farm business sector to a government spending shock. The
rst approach imposes Blanchard and Perotti's (2002) assumption that government spending
does not react endogenously to the state of the economy within the quarter, but only with at
least a one quarter lag. Thus, the government spending shock is in this setting identied by
using the recursively orthogonalized residuals from a VARmodel with the variables mentioned
above with government spending ordered rst. For brevity, this is called BP or recursive
identication, henceforth. The BP approach has been criticized by Ramey (2011), who argues
that the possible presence of anticipated changes in government expenditure invalidates the
BP identifying assumption. If news of future rising expenditure arise, the private sector will
respond before the econometrician actually observes an increase in measured spending. The
resulting mismatch of timing could then lead to erroneous estimates of the shock responses.
To overcome this problem, Ramey (2011) proposes the use of a narrative measure of the
present discounted value of anticipated military spending to identify government spending
shocks (orthogonal in addition to this variable). Therefore, the second approach shown below
adds Ramey's (2011) variable for the present discounted value of expected future military
expenditure as the rst variable in the VAR model, and calculates an anticipated government
shock as an orthogonalized innovation to this variable. This is called the Ramey identication
for short. The third approach uses the same VAR model specication as the previous one,
i.e., with the Ramey news variable ordered rst and government spending ordered second, but
considers a shock not to the anticipation variable, but to the spending variable itself. In this
way, this identication can be seen as an attempt to capture an unanticipated spending shock
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while at the same time controlling for anticipation eects through the inclusion of Ramey's
news variable, which continues to be ordered rst. This third specication is abbreviated as
BP-R below.
Figure 1 shows the results in terms of impulse responses to a one standard deviation
shock to government spending or Ramey's (2011) news variable using these three identication
schemes, along with 1:96 bootstrapped standard erros to capture symmetric 95% condence
bands. For brevity, only the responses of the most interesting variables for the question at
hand are shown. The full set of impulse responses for all variables included in the VAR
models is available upon request.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to government spending shock: BP, Ramey and BP-R
identication schemes.
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In all identication schemes, a positive government spending shock raises private sector
output (though only insignicantly so in the Ramey version), and the government decit
(though less clearly and with a lag in the Ramey specication). Most importantly for the
present purpose, however, is the fact that under all identication schemes labor productivity
(shown in the last but one row of gure 1) rises slightly. The increase in productivity is
certainly not large, and in the Ramey case again not signicantly dierent from zero. How-
ever, as argued above, if one believes that these models truly identify a government spending
shock, then one expects a pronounced decrease in labor productivity.
In principle, it is possible that the increase in measured labor productivity is explained
by the eect of a decline in hours worked on marginal productivity of labor. However, this
does not seem to be the case. Replacing the productivity variable log Yt   logHt, used in
the VAR models above, by the logarithm of hours worked, logHt, and re-estimating (leaving
the rest of the VAR model unchanged) yields the estimated impulse responses of hours to a
positive government spending shock in the three specications shown in gure 2.
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Figure 2: Impulse response of non-farm business hours to government spending shock: BP,
Ramey and BP-R identication schemes.
In all cases, the response of hours appears to be close to zero or slightly positive, at
least for the rst couple of quarters after the shock, but not markedly negative. Thus, the
behavior of hours does not seem to explain the estimated increase in productivity. Moreover,
even if the hours response were indeed negative, this would raise the question how, in that
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case, a positive short run output response could be explained if the maintained assumption
that these models correctly identify a purely non-technological government spending shock
is correct. If technology does not change and the capital stock is predetermined in the short
run, then rising output is associated with increases in hours worked (the possible caveat in
the case that the output expansion is explained by a large concomitant increase in capital
utilization is explored in section 3.4 below).
To sum up, the conclusion obtained so far from standard structural VAR model ap-
proaches is that output increases following a government spending expansion are dicult
to explain without rising productivity. The very fact that the VAR model results point to
productivity increases following rising government spending, casts doubt on their ability to
identify a pure demand side innovation like a government spending shock. If the popular iden-
tication methods shown above truly identify government spending shocks, and if government
spending shocks are truly non-technological in nature, one expects that impulse responses
of output and hours have the same sign and are both of the opposite sign of the response
of labor productivity. Yet, in the estimates it appears that output comoves positively with
productivity, conditional on the identied shock, and weakly positively with hours. Thus, to
the extent that these conventional identication schemes indeed succeed in isolating govern-
ment spending shocks, one needs to explain how an increase in government spending is able
to raise labor productivity.
3.2 Discussion
While in the recent literature the debate has revolved around estimating the magnitude of
the eect of government spending shocks on output so far (the scal multiplier debate), the
empirical evidence provided above highlights a dierent aspect: However large the output
eects may be, they tend to derive not only from comparably large increases in hours or
employment, but also from increases in labor productivity.
This poses an interesting challenge to our understanding of the scal transmission mech-
anism. The evidence given above seems incompatible with the usual view of the way govern-
ment spending aects the economy, as it is embedded in most DSGE models. The standard
transmission mechanism implies that an increase in government spending raises output be-
cause higher spending, through its associated tax burden, exerts a negative wealth eect on
households. This gives households an incentive to reduce their consumption of leisure, which
boosts labor supply such that output rises. Along a neoclassical production function with
capital predetermined in the short run, this implies that decreasing returns to labor set in.
12
Hence, a decrease in measured labor productivity results.
Three principally dierent reactions to the apparent conict between theory and empir-
ical evidence are conceivable. First, the standard view of the scal transmission mechanism
needs to be augmented. If the positive labor productivity response is structural, one has to
adjust theoretical models to accommodate it. Second, the identication methods discussed
above tend to confound government spending shocks with other shocks, in particular with
technological shocks that are known to raise productivity. A positive technology shock raises
productivity and could be mistaken for a government spending shock in a recursive identi-
cation scheme, if the government immediately increases spending in response to the positive
technological shock. Third, an increase in activity following a government spending shock
triggers a rise in unmeasured factor utilization, in particular capital utilization. This might
counteract decreasing returns to labor since the unobserved variable utilization rate of capital
increases too. We discuss each of these possibilities in turn.
If one adopts the rst view and maintains that the orthogonalizations applied in the VAR
models shown above succeed in identifying structural government spending shocks, it could
indeed be that the measured increase in labor productivity is structural. One possibility for
this is that government spending is productive, in the sense of entering private sector pro-
duction functions with a positive output elasticity. Higher government spending then shifts
up the production functions of private rms and leads to a labor productivity increase. How-
ever, direct productivity eects of government spending most likely result from investment
in public infrastructure. This, as a part of the economy's total capital stock, only changes
slowly and therefore can be considered as predetermined in the short run following a spending
boost.
Another possibility is that there are increasing returns to scale, and more stringently
increasing returns to labor. In this case any increases in the scale of production, including
those brought about by an increase in government spending, lower average costs and thus
endogenously raise overall productivity. However, while this could, if the relevant eects are
strong enough, also lead to a rise in measured labor productivity, one expects that (as also
in the case of infrastructure eects from higher spending) private investment increases too,
since private investors would attempt to take advantage of higher productivity. The impulse
responses of investment are, however, not signicantly dierent from zero in the three dis-
cussed structural VAR models. It is positive but not signicantly dierent from zero in the
specications using the Ramey news variable, and negative (albeit not signicantly dierent
from zero) in the BP identication. Several other studies have also found negative invest-
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ment responses to government spending shocks (e.g., Gal et al., 2007). Thus, the positive
investment response that one expects if higher government spending truly increases produc-
tivity (either by shifting the production function by adding public capital, or by shifting the
economy along an increasing returns to scale production function) does not seem to receive
much empirical support.
Hence, we conclude that while we cannot strictly rule out the possibility that procyclical
productivity is indeed a structural feature of government spending shocks, we consider the
evidence in favor of this hypothesis to be weak. Note that this also rules out the possibility
that labor productivity simply increases, because higher private investment raises the capital
stock quickly enough. Even if there were a positive private investment response, this eect is
expected to work intertemporally, with some delay because of the short run predetermined
nature of the capital stock. The productivity response instead appears to be immediate.
In sum, this leaves us with either the second or the third view, namely that the non-
negative productivity response either follows from failure to identify and disentangle govern-
ment spending shocks from technological shocks with the methods employed above, or that
it is the result of unaccounted increases of capacity utilization. The following two sections
are dedicated to our attempt to distinguish between these possibilities.
3.3 Results with sign restrictions imposed
In this subsection, we present the results when we impose the discussed sign restrictions on
the impulse responses from VAR models. We impose restrictions (i) to (iii) introduced above
(positive comovement of output and hours, negative comovement of output and productivity,
positive comovement of government spending and the budget decit) on the impulse responses
of the VAR model to identify government spending shocks. The crucial restriction is (ii),
which has to be fullled by responses to demand side shocks like government spending shocks,
but not by responses to technology shocks. In this way, the sign restrictions are used to
separate government spending shocks, whose eects we want to analyze, from technology
shocks.
The estimated VAR model contains essentially the same variables as discussed in the
preceding subsection. The dierence is that we include output and hours separately in order to
be able to constrain their impulse response relation. Thus, the following variables are included
logGt, log Yt, logHt, log t, Rt, t, Dt, log It. Furthermore, we again include four lags, a
constant and linear and quadratic time trends. We implement the sign restrictions following
the methodology outlined in Rubio-Ramrez et al. (2010). In brief (for more details see
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appendix A), we randomly draw orthogonal matrices to rotate the so-called structural impact
matrix until we have 5000 models in which the impulse response patterns to a government
spending shock match restrictions (i) - (iii) over a horizon of four quarters. Robustness checks
show that imposing the restrictions only for one or two quarters following a shock does not
change the conclusions. From the responses fullling the sign restrictions, we calculate the
median target (MT, henceforth) impulse response as advocated by Fry and Pagan (2011). The
MT impulse response is the impulse response that is closest in a (variance weighted) squared
distance sense to the (pointwise) median curve of the 5000 impulse responses satisfying the
sign restrictions. To allow for inference, we quantify the uncertainty around the estimated
MT responses by a bootstrap method described in appendix A, and use this to construct 90
percent condence bands that are depicted in the gures below as dashed lines.
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Figure 3: Median target impulse responses to government spending shock identied through
restrictions (i) { (iii).
Figure 3 shows the estimated eects of a positive impulse in government spending. In
terms of the median target responses, a positive government spending shock is associated with
an increase in the decit and labor productivity, but with an initial decrease in output and
hours worked. Note that while spending and the decit have been restricted to be positive,
output and hours are unrestricted. Only their relation is restricted by (i) and (ii) given
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above. The median target eect of government spending shocks on output is signicantly
negative for several periods.
The result that government spending expansions are associated with negative output and
hours responses is, of course, surprising. As mentioned above, a large number of previous
studies { using dierent identication assumptions { nds that positive government spending
shocks are associated with short run increases in output. Hence, it is crucial to understand
why our results dier markedly in this respect. The reason is, of course, that we restrict the
relation between the responses of labor productivity by our restriction (ii) to be in accord
with our view of the consequences of demand shocks, i.e., negative comovement between the
impulse responses of output and productivity. In other words, if labor productivity rises
when a government spending shock has occurred, this must have been due to the increase in
the marginal product of labor. This increasing marginal product of labor is implied by the
decline in hours, and thus in output. Hence, by using restriction (ii) we in a sense force the
data to decide whether, conditional on a government spending increase, either an increase
in output and hours with lower productivity, or a decrease in output and hours associated
with a rise in productivity is more likely. The results shown in gure 3 indicate that the data
appear to favor the latter possibility.
The results in gure 3 allow for dierent possible interpretations. One possible conclusion
is that previous estimates that nd a positive response of output to government spending
increases (like those summarized in the preceding subsections) fail to disentangle government
spending shocks from other confounding disturbances, like technology shocks. Our estimates,
in contrast, explicitly rule out the inuence of shocks that shift the short run production
function and thus could be seen as identifying the pure demand side eects of government
spending shocks.
It is important to stress that the results shown in gure 3, as well as in gures 4 and 5
to be discussed later, display the median target response. The corresponding gures 3A to
5A in appendix B show the range of the sign-restricted impulse responses as generated by
our simulation approach. The results from the appendix show that the largest part of the
impulse responses has qualitatively the same shape as the median target impulse that we focus
on, since the pointwise median curve over all impulse responses throughout is close to the
median target impulse response. The gures in appendix B, however, also show that there
are feasible sign-restricted impulse responses with the opposite implications regarding the
eects of government spending shocks on output and hours worked. There is no statistical
way of discriminating between these dierent feasible orthogonalizations, as they are all
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observationally equivalent to the estimated reduced form VAR model. In the literature it
is customary to focus on either the pointwise median curve (not itself an impulse response
function) or the median target impulse response to capture the main tendency in the data.
Both lead to very similar conclusions in our case. Second, and more problematically, we have
thus far assumed that labor is the only variable factor of production that can adjust in the
short run. This is debatable when the amount of services derived from the capital stock
varies over the business cycle, as is implied by many theoretical models with variable capital
utilization. We thus turn to an enlarged model where we allow for utilization changes in the
following section.
3.4 Robustness checks: variable capital utilization and total factor pro-
ductivity
So far, we have assumed that capital services st are identical (or proportional) to the capital
stock kt. This is a useful simplication, because the capital stock is predetermined in the
short run, and moves only slowly even over the medium run. Hence, under this assumption it
is possible to abstract from changes in capital services, at least for the small number of time
periods for which sign restrictions are imposed on impulse responses. However, it is indeed
likely that capital services are more variable than the capital stock itself, if the utilization
rate of the latter is time varying. The question thus arises in how far our results are robust
to allowing for variable capital utilization.
Time varying capital utilization is found to be an important feature of business cycles in
several recent papers, e.g., Justiniano et al. (2010). Empirically, Fernald (2014) provides a
measure of the change in utilization that he computes based on the methodology described
in Basu et al. (2006).3 In the following, since the other variables in our VAR models are in
log-levels as well, we use his measure of utilization change and integrate it (from a starting
value of one) to obtain the level of utilization Ut (which is then taken to logarithms in the
empirical model), and allow the services of capital to depend on it through St = UtKt, where
Kt is the stock of installed capital.
Allowing for variable capital utilization, the log-linearly approximated production func-
tion thus reads as:
yt = zt + aht + (1  a)(ut + kt): (5)
3The data are available at John Fernald's web site http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/economists/john-fernald/.
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Under non-technological shocks, i.e., with zt = 0, and upon neglecting movements in the
capital stock which continues to be predetermined, it follows that measured labor productivity
is approximately given by:
yt   ht  (1  a)(ut   ht): (6)
Hence, given a 2 (0; 1), labor productivity rises in response to a non-technological shock
only if utilization ut increases more strongly than hours worked ht. Thus, with variable
capital utilization our previous restriction (ii), which requires output and productivity to
have opposite signs, may be too restrictive.
We thus extend the VAR model of the previous section with the logarithm of the level
of utilization as an additional variable. The variables used are thus logGt, log Yt, logHt,
log t, Rt, t, Dt, log It, logUt. Using the same notation as in section 2, let euj denote
the impulse response at horizon j of logUt to a government spending shock. In terms of
identication restrictions on the impulse responses, we replace the sign restriction (ii) by a
new sign restriction (iv):
(iv) The dierence of the impulse responses eyj and ehj has the same sign as the dierence of
the impulse responses euj and ehj .
Figure 4 shows the MT impulse responses of the utilization-augmented VAR, with the
government spending shock identied using sign restrictions (i), (iii), and (iv). A positive
shock to government spending appears to trigger a strong negative adjustment of utilization
in the short run. Note that the utilization response itself is not sign-restricted by (iv), but
only its relation to the output and hours responses. As can be seen by a comparison with the
results shown in gure 3 above, the other responses do not change qualitatively compared
to the case without time varying utilization, although the magnitudes and the persistence of
the responses diers. In particular, the median target output and hours reactions are still
negative in the short run, even though less strongly so, since the decrease in utilization picks
up part of the variation. Capital utilization itself is, as theoretically expected, procyclical,
which in the current context means that it declines alongside output. Since utilization declines
by less than hours, labor productivity rises by implication.
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Figure 4: Median target impulse responses to government spending shock identied through
restrictions (i), (iii) and (iv).
Thus, allowing for time varying utilization does not change the basic conclusion reached
above that imposing constant returns to scale (in hours and in utilized capital, given the
predetermined capital stock) leads, in the short run, to a negative median target response of
output and hours to a government spending shock, accompanied by a positive productivity
response.
Recall that the main purpose of the restrictions we use is to help disentangle government
spending shocks from other shocks that directly shift the production function. Therefore, it
might be useful, as a further robustness check, to control directly for a measure of technology
in the VAR model. It is well known that standard measures of total factor productivity
(TFP) that are based on the classic Solow residual contain a component that is endogenous
to the business cycle. The reason is that with procyclical utilization and possibly imperfect
competition, the productive contribution of the input factors is larger than their income
shares, with the latter commonly used as production elasticities in the computation of Solow
residuals. Fernald (2014) also provides a corrected TFP measure that takes account of these
eects, based on a methodology to purge spurious cyclicality due to utilization changes and
markups expounded in Basu et al. (2006). Thus, his utilization corrected TFP series is likely
to be a better proxy for exogenous shocks to the aggregate production function, and hence
an appropriate control variable for us. Since his measure is in growth rates, we integrate it
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from a starting value of one to get the variable TFPt, and use its log-level as an additional
variable in the VAR model.
After a government spending shock that has no impact on technology, the impulse re-
sponse at horizon j of the total factor productivity measure to this government spending
shock, gtfpj , should be zero, at least in the vicinity of the shock impact at short horizons j.
We thus impose, as an additional identifying restriction, the exact zero-at-impact restriction:
(v) The impulse responsegtfpj does not change on impact under government spending shocks.
This model version thus mixes the sign restrictions (i), (iii), and (iv) with the exact zero
restriction (v). The implementation is based on the methodology set out in Arias et al. (2014)
described in appendix A. Figure 5 shows the median target impulse responses of the VAR
model with the variables logGt, log Yt, logHt, log t, Rt, t, Dt, log It, logUt, log TFPt.
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Figure 5: Median target impulse responses to government spending shock identied through
restrictions (i), (iii), (iv) and (v).
The MT impulse responses shown in gure 5 show some dierences compared to those
previously discussed. In particular, while output and hours still decline in the short run, the
size of the negative response is somewhat mitigated. To the extent that the inclusion of the
log TFP variable succeeds in controlling for residual technological disturbances unaccounted
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for in the previous models, the estimates shown in gure 5 give a cleaner indication of the
consequences of a government spending shock. Most clearly visible, the response of utilization
now appears rather unclear, and statistically not signicantly dierent from zero. This is also
true for the TFP response itself, which is only constrained to be exactly zero in the impact
period, and shows some endogenous but altogether insignicant variation thereafter. Labor
productivity reacts less strongly than in the previous models, but the response is still positive.
However, the main pattern found in the simpler models above still holds: Output and hours
tend to decline for some periods following a government spending increase, whereas labor
productivity rises slightly. We thus conclude that the central result presented in the previous
subsection is robust to the consideration of both variable capital utilization and total factor
productivity as additional control variables.
4 Conclusions
Taking stock, the estimates presented above all highlight the central point: As soon as we
impose the crucial requirement that the impulse responses of structural VAR models aimed
at identifying government spending shocks exhibit behavior required to be consistent with a
standard constant returns to scale aggregate production function, we nd that the median
target responses to a government spending increase imply short run declines in private sector
output and hours, along with rising labor productivity. This result is robust to the inclusion
of variable capacity utilization and to additionally including a measure of utilization-adjusted
total factor productivity. Since the majority of previous studies has found positive output
responses following government spending increases, the question arises, of course, how to
interpret the results presented here.
Our results certainly cannot be taken to necessarily imply that other identication schemes
that tend to nd positive output responses to government spending increases are wrong.
While there is the possibility that identication schemes that do not take into account the
restrictions we impose on productivity behavior confound demand shocks deriving from gov-
ernment spending variations with technology shocks, we need to be cautious here for at least
three reasons. First, sign restriction methods do not allow to exactly identify government
spending shocks, but only the set of admissible model impulse responses given the restric-
tions. The range of admissible models includes impulse responses for output and hours of
both signs. However, as demonstrated by the median target impulse responses shown above
(and by the gures in appendix B), the majority of admissible impulse responses points to-
wards a negative reaction of these variables, when forced to have a negative correlation of
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the responses of output and labor productivity in the short run.
Second, we use an estimated regressor as our variable capital utilization rate, which itself
is not directly observable. Hence, although the measure is carefully constructed by Fernald
(2014), there might still be unaccounted residual variation in true capital utilization that
is not captured in the measured variable. As a consequence, observed labor productivity
behavior could still be misleading and not fully capture movements in the marginal product
of labor.
Finally, it might be that the main identifying restriction we use, namely constant returns
to scale in the aggregate production function, does not hold empirically. In this case, the
negative impulse response correlation between output and utilization-adjusted productivity
need not hold. This would invalidate our central identication assumption. While this is
possible in principle, we note that a large majority of business cycle models assumes the
standard assumption of constant returns to scale. Allowing for increasing returns to scale
requires an altogether rethinking of the scal transmission process in such models. The
distinction between these possibilities is arguably an important topic of future research. At
this point, we conclude that the data seem to imply that shocks to government spending
either have negative output consequences, or if they have not, then this can, in our view,
only be explained through the existence of aggregate increasing returns to scale.
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Appendix A
The VAR model
We describe the employed econometric model in this section for the sake of completeness and,
mainly, to x notation. A k-variable structural VAR model for xt is given by:
A0xt = + C1t+ C2t
2 +A1xt 1 +A2xt 2 +   +Apxt p + "t; (7)
where xt 2 Rk, "t  WN(0; Ik), A0; : : : ; Ap 2 Rkk, ;C1; C2 2 Rk. A0, the so-called
structural matrix, is assumed to be non-singular. In order to dene a unique lag length p we
assume Ap 6= 0, in our application p = 4. The corresponding reduced form, obtained from
(7) by pre-multiplication with A 10 , is given by:
xt =  +D1t+D2t
2 +B1xt 1 +   +Bpxt p + ut; (8)
with Bi = A
 1
0 Ai; i = 1; : : : ; p, Dj = A
 1
0 Cj ; j = 1; 2,  = A
 1
0 , and A
 1
0 "t = ut 
WN(0;u), with consequently u = A
 1
0 A
 10
0 .
Denoting with B(z) = Ik   B1z        Bpzp, we impose the causality assumption,
det(B(z)) 6= 0 8 jzj  1. Under this assumption, the errors ut correspond to the one-
step prediction errors from the Wold decomposition, i.e., we obtain an innite order moving
average representation of the form:
xt = ~ + ~D1t+ ~D2t
2 +
1X
j=0
jut j (9)
= ~ + ~D1t+ ~D2t
2 +
1X
j=0
jA
 1
0 "t j (10)
The (r; s)-element of j = jA
 1
0 describes the change of variable r to a unit increase of "t;s
after j-periods, i.e., at horizon j. In the main text we use the short-hand notation emj for
this, with m denoting an element of the vector of variables xt, since we are throughout only
interested in the eects of government spending shocks, i.e., for one particular s only.
Identication schemes
As is well-known, the structural form (7) is not identied, for a detailed discussion see Hannan
and Deistler (1988). The literature provides a large array of approaches to point or set
identication of structural VAR models. In our paper we employ the following ones:
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(1) Recursive identication: The structural matrix, A0 is lower (upper) triangular, or,
equivalently, A 10 , the structural impact matrix, is lower (upper) triangular.
(2) Sign restrictions: 
(r;s)
j is restricted to be either nonnegative or nonpositive for some
combinations of (r; s; j), r; z 2 f 1; : : : ; k g, j 2 N0.
(3) Zero and sign restrictions: 
(r;s)
j
= 0 for some (r; s; j), and some 
(r;s)
j are sign restricted
as dened in the previous item (2). Note already here that in our paper we only consider
zero-at-impact restrictions, i.e., j = 0.
The recursive identication scheme yields an exactly identied structural VAR. It is im-
portant to note, however, that sign restrictions and the mixture of zero and sign restrictions,
in general do not yield exactly identied structural forms. The identied set for the impulse
responses is, thus, in general non-singleton for the second and third cases.4
Impulse response functions
The reduced form parameters are estimated by ordinary least squares, resulting in bB1; : : : ; bBp
and bu. Thus, an estimate of the reduced form impulse response sequence (^j)j0 follows
immediately. The approach to obtain structural impulse responses diers across cases (1) to
(3). In every case, however, the starting point is the identity u = A
 1
0 A
 10
0 and the available
estimate bu.
For recursive identication consider the (unique) Cholesky decomposition of bu = bLbL0,
with bL lower triangular (and positive elements along the diagonal), and set bA 10 = bL.
Now, observe that for any unitary matrix Q 2 Rkk, with QQ0 = Q0Q = Ik, it holds that
bu = bLQQ0bL0 = bLQbL0Q (11)
is another valid decomposition of bu. Thus, the whole range of structural impulse responses
consistent with the reduced form error variance matrix u is given by varying Q 2 Rkk
over all unitary matrices (for given Cholesky factor L). This is clearly not feasible and
thus approximate solutions are required. Here we follow the approach of Rubio-Ramrez et
al. (2010) to generate uniformly distributed Q-matrices:
1. Draw a matrixM with i.i.d. standard normal entries and perform the QR-decomposition
of the matrix M = QR. Doing so, Q is unitary and has the uniform (or Haar) distri-
bution.
4Note that imposing too many sign restrictions can reduce the set of feasible impulse responses to the
empty set. The same is, a fortiori, true for the combination of zero and sign restrictions.
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2. Calculate the corresponding structural impulse response function fbQj gj=0;:::;J =
fbj bLQgj=0;:::;J and verify whether the formulated sign restrictions are fullled. If so,
keep
nbQj o
j=0;:::;J
, otherwise discard it.
3. Repeat these calculations until the set of retained structural impulse responses contains
n = 5000 elements.
From the 5000 elements the median target impulse response function is then calculated as
described below.
It remains to discuss the implementation of the combination of zero and sign restrictions,
where we follow Arias et al. (2014). As can be guessed by now, the solution consists of
drawing random unitary matrices that imply that the resultant bQ0 satises the required
zero-at-impact restrictions in addition to the formulated sign restrictions. We describe the
approach here only for our specic application, in which TFP is ordered last in the VAR
model where we combine zero and sign restrictions:
1. Find a matrix N1 2 Rk(k 1) with N 01N1 = Ik 1 such that bL[k;]N1 = 0, with bL[k;]
denoting the k-th row of bL.
2. Generate a vector z 2 Rk with i.i.d. standard normally distributed entries and form
the vector:
q =
1
jj[N1 0k1]zjj [N1 0k1]z; (12)
i.e., project the vector z on the space spanned by N1 and normalize it to unit length.
3. Find a matrix N2 2 Rk(k 1) with N 02N2 = Ik 1 such that q0N2 = 0.
4. Draw a matrix M 2 R(k 1)(k 1) with i.i.d. standard normal entries and calculate the
QR decomposition of N2M , i.e.,
N2M = [ ~Q1 ~Q2]
24 R1
0
35 ; (13)
with ~Q1 2 Rk(k 1).
5. Form the matrix Q+ = [q ~Q1] and calculate the corresponding structural impulse re-
sponse function fbQ+j gj=0;:::;J = fbj bLQ+gj=0;:::;J , with bLQ+ = bLQ+, and verify whether
the formulated sign restrictions are fullled. If so, keep
nbQ+j o
j=0;:::;J
, otherwise dis-
27
card it. Note that by construction, the zero-at-impact restriction on the structural
impulse response of log TFP holds for all draws.
6. Repeat these calculations until the set of retained structural impulse responses contains
n = 5000 elements.
In the discussion of results with sign restrictions we focus on the median target (MT)
impulse response functions, compare Fry and Pagan (2011). The MT impulse response func-
tion is the element-wise closest impulse response function { out of the retained 5000 impulse
responses { to the median curve, which itself is not an impulse response function corre-
sponding to any of the structural models. Thus, we consider the set of structural impulse
responses bn = fbnj gj=0;:::;J for n = 1; : : : ; 5000 and denote the (element-wise) median curve
as bmed = fbj;medgj=0;:::;J . The median target impulse response is dened as:
bMT = argminn=1;:::;5000X
r2R
X
s2S
1bVr;s
X
j2J
b(r;s)j;n   b(r;s)j;med2 ; (14)
with R;S  f1; : : : ; kg and J  f0; : : : ; Jg. bVr;s is a measure of variability of the set of
sign-restricted impulse responses for variable r and shock s. Starting with dVar(b(r;s)j;n ) =
1
5000
P5000
n=1 (
b(r;s)j;n   b(r;s)j;n )2, with b(r;s)j;n = 15000P5000n=1 b(r;s)j;n , we use two variability measuresbVr;s:
bV maxr;s = max
j2J
dVar(b(r;s)j;n ) (15)
bV avgr;s = 1jJ jX
j2J
dVar(b(r;s)j;n ); (16)
with jJ j denoting the cardinality of J . In our application the results do not dier markedly
when using either the maximum or the average variation measure. The results in the paper
are based on the average measure bV avgr;s .
Note that the general formulation above, with the index sets R;S and J allows to calcu-
late the distances for any combination of variables, shocks and horizons deemed important
for the econometric analysis at hand.5 In relation to our application we consider only on the
impulse responses to the government spending shock, i.e., S = f1g and the restricted impulse
responses. Thus, for the three specications considered, we have R = f1; 2; 5; 7g (baseline
specication), f1; 2; 5; 7; 9g (utilization rate augmented specication) or f1; 2; 5; 7; 9; 10g (uti-
lization rate and TFP augmented specication). The horizons considered are J = f0; 1; 2; 3g,
5Clearly, the dierence can also be calculated with any other quantile or the mean as target.
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with the results robust to choosing only one or two quarters.
Inference on impulse response functions
The condence bands for the recursive identication scheme are obtained using the bootstrap
algorithm proposed in Kilian (1998), which is based on a preliminary (simulation based) bias
correction step. The 5000 bootstrap samples are then drawn using bias corrected parameter
estimates.
Some more care has to be taken into account when bootstrapping the median target solu-
tion. The median target structural impulse response function by construction depends uponbB1; : : : ; bBp as well as bLQMT = bLQMT , with QMT denoting the rotation matrix corresponding
to the minimizer of (14). Thus, resampling data from the reduced form model has to be
combined with the structural decomposition given by bLQMT , which is done by a modication
of the previous algorithm:
1. As in the standard case, generate a bootstrap sample, x1; : : : ; xT using the Kilian (1998)
bootstrap, i.e., bias corrected parameter estimates.
2. Estimate the parameters of the VAR model using xt , resulting in parameter estimatesbB1 ; : : : ; bBp . Calculate the structural impulse response function using these parameter
estimates and the original bLQMT .
3. Verify whether the impulse response function from the previous item, fbQMT j gj=0;:::;J ,
satises the formulated sign restrictions. If it does, keep it, otherwise discard it.
4. Repeat the above steps until 1000 impulse responses are retained and calculate pointwise
bootstrap condence bands as usual from these 1000 impulse responses.
Appendix B
In Sections 3.3{3.4 in the main text we present the median target impulse responses as
summaries or typical representatives of the set of sign-restricted impulse responses. In the
following we augment this information by additionally plotting the element-wise median curve
as well as the element-wise 10-th and 90-th quantile curves. As already mentioned, the median
curve, and similarly the quantile curves, do not themselves correspond to structural models.
This is, since for any variable, shock and horizon the median or quantile may { and in general
will { correspond to a dierent structural model.
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The structure of the following plots is the same as that of gures 3{5 in the main text.
Figure 3A corresponds to the specication shown in gure 3, gure 4A to the specication
of gure 4 and gure 5A to the specication of gure 5. The gures show that the feasible
set of sign-restricted impulse responses includes elements with both positive and negative
responses of output, hours and labor productivity to a government spending shock. The
gures also show, however, that the main tendency points towards the direction discussed in
the main text and represented by the median target impulse responses. There is only one
small noticeable dierence: the median target response of the utilization rate shown in gure
5 shows a positive albeit not signicant value in the rst period, whereas the median curve
(shown in gure 5A) starts o negatively.
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12 ×10
-3 Spending
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4 ×10
-3 Output
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4 ×10
-3 Hours
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5 ×10
-3 Deficit
0 5 10 15 20
Quarter
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5 ×10
-3 Labor productivity
90% quantile Median Target Median 10% quantile
Figure 3A: Set of sign-restricted impulse responses to government spending shock identied
through restrictions (i) { (iii).
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Figure 4A: Set of sign-restricted impulse responses to government spending shock identied
through restrictions (i), (iii) and (iv).
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Figure 5A: Set of point- and sign-restricted impulse responses to government spending
shock identied through restrictions (i), (iii), (iv) and (v).
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